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I. INTRODUCTION
"At the end of 2008, more than one in ten homeowners
were either past due or in foreclosure."' Economists project "one
in every nine homeowners ... will lose their home to foreclosure"
by the end of 2012.2 Meaning that "8.1 million households... [will
be in] foreclosure."3 Because of the falling housing market and
high numbers of foreclosures that have adversely affected our
national economy, Congress has enacted legislation to curb
foreclosures.4
The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act5 (HFSTH)
authorizes home loan servicers to modify mortgages in foreclosure
so that homeowners can continue to make mortgage payments and
6
avoid foreclosure.6 HFSTH attempts to encourage modifications
by providing incentives to loan servicers to modify mortgages and
a servicer safe harbor provision to protect servicers from investor
* This Note is part of the North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the
Foreclosure Crisis.
1. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages
in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565, 567 (2009); see also id. at 565 (testing the
assumption that "protecting lenders from losses ... encourages them to lend more
and at lower rates").
2. Id. at 567.
3. Dana Heller, Understanding the Economic Complexities of Loan Modification
Programs, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, Feb. 25, 2009, at 2, http://www.nera.com/
image/PUBLoanModificationProgram_.0209.pdf.
4. See Press Release, Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Statement on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.ustres.gov/press/
releases/hp1129.htm [hereinafter Paulson Jr. Statement].
5. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
6. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act § 201(codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1639a); see also Editorial, Hurting the Housing Market; Obama's Policies
Drive Down Prices, WASH. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A20, available at http://www.wash
ingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/29/hurting-the-housing-market/ (discussing the
recent drop in housing prices and the legislation that may have caused the drop).
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litigation arising from a servicer's modification of mortgages in the
loan pool.'
Many members of the public are pleased with the inclusion
of the safe harbor provision in the Act.8 They believe that the Act
will change servicers' traditional roles and encourage
modifications.9 Nevertheless, some consumer advocates believe
that the Act was weakened due to political pressure from banking
industry actors who oppose bankruptcy procedure changes.1 °
Another author in this symposium, Marjorie B. Maynard, argues
that the Act will not be effective unless homeowners can force a
cramdown in Chapter Thirteen bankruptcy.11 Although the Act's
safe harbor is politically popular and may not be effective, its
opponents note that the possible implications of the provision
were not thoroughly examined and argue that this hasty legislation
violates the Fifth Amendment's property protections. 12
Unfortunately, because the Act was only recently passed,
commentators can only speculate whether Congress will enact
tougher provisions or if the legislative efforts will be struck down
as unconstitutional.13  Greenwich Financial Services, et al. v.
7. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act § 201(b), 123 stat. 1638 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639a); see also Press Release, House Comm. on Fin.
Services, Judiciary and Fin. Services Comm. Joint Hous. Bill Introduced in the House
(Feb. 23,2009) (describing the benefits to servicers provided by HFSTH).
8. See Press Release, Washington State Dep't of Fin. Inst. DFI Applauds The
FHA's Efforts to Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure in Obtaining Loan
Modifications (Aug. 5,2009), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumers/news/2009/fha.htm
9. Id.
10. See Margie Burns, Senate Caves to Bankers, Passes up Chance to Help U.S.
Homeowners, ATLANTIC FREE PRESS, (May 31, 2009), http://www.atlanticfreepress.
comlnews/1/9836-senate-caves-to-bankers-passes-up-chance-to-help-us-home
owners.html.
11. Marjorie B. Maynard, Note, Mortgage Cramdown in Bankruptcy: A
Necessary Incentive to Encourage Mortgage Modifications, 14 N.C. BANKING INST.
275 (2010).
12. See Complaint at 12, Greenwich Fin. Serv. Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, LLC
v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., N.Y. Sup. Ct. Pleadings 58147 (2008), available at 2008
NY S. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 77 (explaining that the PSA agreed to by the parties
requires Countrywide to repurchase modified loans); see also Isaac Gradman, Why
Should Servicers Get a Safe Harbor? How One Investor's Lawsuit Forced Bank of
America to Seek Shelter in Washington, LOMBARD STREET, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.finreg2l.com/lombard-street/why-should-servicers-get-a-safe-harbor-how-
one-investor%E2%80%99s-lawsuit-forced-bank-america (discussing the economic
impact of the litigation safeharbor on the MBS investors).
13. Gradman, supra note 12; Christopher Mayer et al., A New Proposal for Loan
Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 417-28 (2009) (proposing solutions to
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Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., a recent case being heard in
New York state court, may provide an answer to how courts will
decide if the Act's safe harbor is constitutional' 4 Until Greenwich
Financial is decided, the safe harbor's constitutionality will
continue to be debated in academic legal writing. 5  Some
commentators have proposed an alternative solution that would
not result in a constitutional violation. 6 Based on Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,7 Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,8 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
Corp.,'9 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 0 however,
the HFSTH's litigation safe harbor provision for mortgage
servicers unconstitutionally deprives investors of their property
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2'
"barriers" to "successful loan modifications"); Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide
Loses Ruling in Loan Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009 at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/business/20bofa.html.
14. See Complaint, supra note 12; Motion to Remand, Greenwich Fin. Serv.
Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions
11343 (2008), available at 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 18208. The case was
remanded from the Southern District of New York back to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Greenwich Fin. Serv. Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, LLC
v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (2009).
15. See Gradman, supra note 12, at Part III.
16. See Mayer et al., supra note 13.
17. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (displaying
the three factors analyzed to determine whether a non-physical, regulatory taking has
occurred that requires compensation).
18. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (showing that
compensation is required where government action leaves an individual's property
economically valueless).
19. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(outlining that a permanent physical intrusion by government, no matter now small,
requires compensation).
20. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (discussing the
requirement that government action must advance a substantial state interest to
avoid being a taking requiring compensation).
21. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-32 ("In the case of land .. we think the notion
pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject to the "implied limitation"
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 ("our cases
describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the police power as
a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest."); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441
("We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a
taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation
of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive
than perhaps any other category of property regulation."); Penn Central 438 U.S. at
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To support this argument Part II will discuss the safe
harbor provision in detail, how it has been interpreted and
received by various groups, and how it evolved into its current
statutory form.22 Part III will give a brief overview of Takings
Clause precedent and will analyze the safe harbor's
constitutionality based on that precedent.23  Part IV will
demonstrate the power of the safe harbor provision by showing
how investor rights have been compromised and how servicers
may be able to benefit under the new scheme.24 Finally, Part V
will discuss alternatives to the litigation safe harbor and
suggestions on how Congress's intentions might be better met and
how individual's rights can be better protected by improving• 21
refinancing options.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE LITIGATION SAFE HARBOR
A. Factors Influencing the Development of the Safe Harbor
At a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee in July
2009, individuals who represent the key players in the housing
market attempted to provide some insight about methods that
would help preserve homeownership.26 At this hearing, the
representatives explained the systemic problems that impede
mortgage modifications. Curtis Glovier, Managing Director of
Fortress Investment Group, blamed the treatment of second liens
in bankruptcy accounting as a factor that makes lenders and
136-38 ("inquiry may be narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact of the
law on appellants' parcel")
22. See infra Part II, pp. 240-44.
23. See infra Part III, pp. 244-51.
24. See infra Part IV, pp. 251-53.
25. See infra Part V, pp. 235-56.
26. See generally Preserving Homeownership: Progress Needed to Prevent
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs Comm.,
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Curtis Glovier, Managing Director, Fortress
Investment Group) [hereinafter Glovier Testimony]; Preserving Homeownership:
Progress Needed to Prevent Foreclosures: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing,
& Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of William Apgar, Senior
Advisor to the Secretary for Mortgage Finance, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development) [hereinafter Apgar Testimony].
27. See Apgar Testimony, supra note 26
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investors unwilling to participate.Y He explained that under the
program, banks that offered second mortgages and their affiliated
servicers, who are aware that the second lien is subordinate to the
primary lien, are "unwilling to ... complete a refinance" because it
would "defer the recognition of losses on the second lien
portfolios."29  HUD's Senior Advisor for Mortgage Finance,
William Apgar, stated that the reluctance to participate in the
programs is a result of the lack of incentives for lenders and
servicers. °
Outside of Congressional hearings, academics have also
discussed the problem of uninterested servicers.3" Dr. Dana
Heller, Vice President of NERA Economic Consulting and former
Professor of Financial Services at Tel Aviv University, stated that
the unwillingness of servicers to modify loans in foreclosure is a
result of covenants in their PSAs with investors that create a
"litigation risk" for them. 2 Some PSAs give "limited (or no)
authority to the servicer to modify loans," so participation in the
Making Home Affordable program would be a breach of contract
giving investors a chance to bring suit. 33  Because the fear of
investor litigation was one of the significant factors hindering
modification, academics suggested a safe harbor that would
1 4
protect the servicers from the investors.
B. The Servicer Litigation Safe Harbor
Section 201 of HFSTH states that "[i]n order to reduce the
number of foreclosures and to stabilize property values, local
economies, and the national economy, servicers must be given...
(A) authorization to ... modify ... and refinance mortgage loans.
and (B) a safe harbor to enable such servicers to exercise these
28. See Glovier Testimony, supra note 26.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Heller, supra note 3, at 8.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id.
34. Mayer et al., supra note 13, at 422-23.
20101
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authorities."35 The section amends the Truth in Lending Act to
provide that:
[A] servicer that is deemed to be acting in the best
interests of all investors or other parties ... and shall
not be liable to any party who is owed a duty.. .and
shall not be subject to any injunction, stay, or other
equitable relief to such party, based solely upon the
implementation by the servicer of a qualified loss
mitigation plan.36
The section also defines "qualified loss mitigation plan" as:
(A) a residential loan modification, workout, or
other loss mitigation plan, including to the extent
that the Secretary of the Treasury determines
appropriate, a loan sale, real property disposition,
trial modification, pre-foreclosure sale, and deed in
lieu of foreclosure, that is described or authorized in
guidelines issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or
his designee under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008; and
(B) a refinancing of a mortgage under the Hope for
37Homeowners program.
The language of the statute gives the servicer broad
authority to determine what action can be taken to mitigate loss
but the section resticts when a loss mitigation plans may be used.38
HFSTH requires that before entering into a qualified loss
mitigation plan: (1) the servicer must believe that "[d]efault on
payment of such mortgage has occurred, is imminent, or is
reasonably foreseeable," (2) "[t]he mortgagor occupies the
property securing the mortgage[,]" and (3) "[t]he servicer
35. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 Stat.
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reasonably determined ...that the application of such qualified
loss, mitigation plan.., will likely provide an anticipated recovery
on the outstanding principal mortgage debt that will exceed the
anticipated recovery through foreclosures."39  Although the
language of the provision seems to be clear about the breadth of
the safe harbor, there is much debate as to how much protection
the safe harbor will provide.40
The last subsection of section 201, the "Rule of
Construction Clause," provides that the safe harbor will not affect
a party's right to bring suit under certain circumstances. 41 It
explicitly states that
No provision...shall be construed as affecting the
liability of any servicer or person. . .for actual fraud
in the origination or servicing of a loan or in the
implementation of a qualified loss mitigation plan,
or for the violation of a State or Federal law,
including laws regulating the origination of
mortgage loans, commonly referred to as predatory
lending laws.42
Although some of the statute's provisions seem to shield
servicers from all things short of illegal acts, this final subsection
means it will not protect servicers when they act unlawfully.43
Investors also believe they may have found two loopholes that will
allow suit outside of a violation of predatory lending laws.
The ABS Investor Advocate concluded after analyzing the
"Scope of the Safe Harbor" clause that the inclusion of the word
"solely" allows investors to bring suit "[i]f [they] can find any other
basis for liability-either a violation of a statute or even a breach of
any provision of the PSA (other than provisions that prohibit
39. Id.
40. See Owen Cyrulnik, How Safe is the Harbor?, ABS INVESTOR ADVOCATE,
May 22, 2009, http://www.absinvestoradvocate.com/2009/05/articles/servicer-safe-
harbor-l/how-safe-is-the-harbor/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Cyrulnik,
How Safe].
41. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, § 201.
42. Id.
43. See id; Cyrulnik, How Safe, supra note 40.
2010]
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modification)."4 The second potential loophole is the
interpretation of the "Rule of Construction Clause.,
45
Commentators have interpreted the Clause to mean that "some
classes of investors may be able to assert a claim in instances when
an express contractual provision in the applicable pooling and
servicing agreement . . . expressly prohibits the suggested
modification." 46  To date, no courts have ruled on the
interpretation of these clauses.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE SERVICER LITIGATION SAFE HARBOR
A. Analysis of the Language
When discussing the strength of the safe harbor provision, a
commentator observed that "when we want to build a road and we
take somebody's land for the public good, we compensate them. If
you want to take somebody's mortgage rights for the public good,
you compensate them."47 Both supporters and opponents of the
safe harbor provision have recognized that there may be a
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.48 The Fifth
Amendment states:
No person shall. . .be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.49
44. Cyrulnik, How Safe, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. Financial Crisis Special Situations Group Client Alerts: Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, SONNENSCHEIN PUBLICATIONS (Sonnenschein Nath &
Rosenthal, LLP), May 29, 2009, http://www.sonnenschein.com/practice-areas/finan
cial-crisis/pub-detail.aspx?id=51668&type=E-Alerts (May 29, 2009)
47. Home Foreclosures: Will Voluntary Mortgage Modification Help Families
Save Their Homes? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111' Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Mark A.
Calabria, PH.D., Director of Financial Regulatory Studies, Cato Institute).
48. Gradman, supra note 12, at Part V; Mayer et al, supra note 13, at 424.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The Supreme Court has continued to hold that "the 'Fifth
Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole[.]"5 °
When determining whether a taking requiring compensation has
occurred, the court first looks to the nature of the taking."
B. The Constitutionality of the Provision
1. Case Law Analysis and Interpretation
Traditionally, the court has recognized two types of takings
that could require compensation: physical takings52 and regulatory
takings. 3 In the case of physical takings, the court has stated that
"permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve" and
that government may "never deny compensation for a physical
takeover.54 All courts considering this issue have reached this
conclusion because "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property."'55 For regulatory takings, the court has
applied a balancing test to determine the impact that the
regulation has had on the property owner to see how similar it is to
a physical taking. 6 If the regulation strips the property of all
50. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)
(quoting Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Court qualifies this
statement in Penn Central by stating "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' required that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. at 124
51. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, at 1014 (1992).
52. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(showing that regulatory takings can be physical in nature).
.53. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (proving that although a taking can be purely
regulatory in nature, the effect on the property may be such that it requires
compensation); Nollan v. Cal. Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring that
regulatory takings substantially advance a legitimate state interest to avoid payment
to the affected property owner); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing a
balancing test for purely regulatory takings).
54. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-27 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 433 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
56. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
2010]
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economic value,57 or has had a significant economic impact on the
owner and has interfered greatly with investment-backed
expectations, the court has also agreed to recognize a taking
requiring compensation.
Four major cases lay out how the court has handled various
government actions under the Takings Clause regulatory analysis.
First, in Penn Central, the Court determined that the New York
City landmark law did not "arbitrarily" deprive the plaintiffs of
their property even though it would not allow them to reconstruct
their building to expand their business.58 The case established an
"ad hoc analysis" of three factors: (1) the "economic impact of the
regulation," (2) the "extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) the
"character" of the governmental action. 9 Although the Court did
not clarify the required strength of each of the factors, it did base
the Penn Central decision almost solely on the "economic impact"
factor.' Justice Brennan explained that the regulation did not
prohibit the plaintiffs from using the property in the same manner
that they had been previously and that some government actions
can be "viewed as permissible. . .even when prohibiting the most
beneficial use of the property."'"
The remaining cases limited the application of Penn Central
or provided guidance on how to use its balancing test. In Loretto,
the court ruled the New York statute requiring property owners to
allow a cable company to install cable boxes on their property and
prohibiting them from collecting payment from tenants for cable
usage was unconstitutional.62 In striking down the statute, the
court reasoned that regulatory takings can take the form of a
"physical intrusion by government" akin to traditional physical
takings and render the balancing test irrelevant.63 The New York
statute allowed for a complete physical takeover of the space
57. Id. at 1027-31 (articulating the "economic value" standard); Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124 (stating the "investment backed expectations" standard).
58. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 125.
62. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
63. Id. at 426.
246 [Vol. 14
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containing the cable box because the property owner no longer
had the power to "posses use [or] dispose of it" and was therefore
unconstitutional. 6' Accordingly, the Court will not engage in a
Penn Central balancing analysis where a statute is too close to a
"physical intrusion by government."
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the court
applied the balancing test to the California Coastal Commission's
conditional building permit and held that the permit did not
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest."65 Justice Scalia
explained that for a government action to be permissible there
must be an "essential nexus" between the action taken and the
public interest to be protected.66 As a part of the regulatory
balancing test, the court reasoned that for a regulatory taking to be
permissible, the action taken must advance a substantial state
interest.67 The court did not allow the action taken because the
conditional permit did not prevent the stated goal of preventing
the development of a "wall of houses. ' 68
Finally, in Lucas v. South Carolina, the court recognized
another form of regulatory taking where the government action
renders the property economically "valueless., 69 In Lucas, the
South Carolina Coast Commission re-zoned Lucas' parcels of land
and prohibited him from building on the land.7° The Court found
that "when the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking."71 To clarify the reach of Lucas the court
stated that compensation is due where there is a "total deprivation
of use.
7 2
64. Id. (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
65. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-40 (1987) (quoting Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
66. Id. at 837.
67. Id. at 834.
68. Id. at 840.
69. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory
Takings § 7-3(a)(1) (3d. ed. 2005). Eagle, supra note 103 at § 7-3(a)(1).
70. Id. at 1007
71. Id. at 1019.
72. Eagle, supra note 69 at § 7-3(a)(1).
2010]
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Although Loretto and Lucas are not directly on point, MBS
investors can argue that the safe harbor provision results in a
Takings Clause violation citing Penn Central and Nollan 3
Although Penn Central is vague, it gives great guidance to
investors.
The nature of the dispute between investors, servicers, and
the federal government leads us to the Penn Central test. MBS
investors are angered by the safe harbor because it prevents the
investors from enforcing contracts requiring servicers to either
repurchase loans or foreclose so that they might receive the
74highest return on their investment. Unlike later takings cases
that narrowed the scope of the balancing test, Penn Central did not
involve a physical invasion of property75  nor a complete
deprivation of economic benefit.7 6 In applying the Penn Central
test, we first look to the economic impact of the regulation.7 7 It
can be argued that the economic impact of the safe harbor can be
devastating. The safe harbor provision has cost blameless
investors billions of dollars, 79 and, depending on the size of the
investment, could significantly affect the investors' financial
stability."" Next, we should look to the extent the regulation has
interfered with the investors' investment-backed expectations.8 1
The expectations of investors are directly adverse to the safe
harbor provision of the Act.82  Investors expected that the
covenants that they entered into with loan servicers would be
73. Loretto is not on point for MSB investors because no physical taking has
occurred. Lucas is not controlling because there has not been a complete deprivation
of economic use, and because investors will be able to receive some money from
modifications. Since MBS investors will receive some money, they cannot claim that
the securities have lost all economic value.
74. Morgenson, supra note 13.
75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
77. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
78. David J. Grais, Five Reasons Why "Servicer Safe Harbor'Will be Bad for
America, ABS INVESTOR ADVOCATE, May 18, 2009, http://www.absinvestorad
vocate.com/2009/05/articles/servicer-safe-harbor-1/five-reasons-why-servicer-safe-
harbor-will-be-bad-for-america/ (last visited Jan. 20,2010).
79. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 11.
80. See Glovier Testimony, supra note 26.
81. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
82. Grais, supra note 78.
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enforceable by the courts but the safe harbor provision interferes
so much with their expectations that it may nullify provisions in
their PSAs and subjects them to an investment scheme that they
would not have entered into initially.83 Finally, the test requires
consideration of the "character of the governmental action.
84
Although "a taking may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion," the Court does not state explicitly or implicitly that the
action taken must be a physical invasion for the plaintiff to be able
to prove a taking has occurred.85 Unfortunately the lack of clarity
on the relative weight of each Penn Central factor makes
succeeding under the test difficult.& The vagueness of the test also
requires that we wait for directly analogous litigation.87
Relying on Nollan, the MBS investors can argue that the
relationship between the safe harbor and the HFSTH's goal is
weak. The administration claims that the Act and the safe harbor
provision will improve the housing market,88 while investors claim
that this safe harbor will ultimately harm the housing market.89
Investor advocates state that the housing market will be negatively
affected by the safe harbor provision because investors will be less
likely to provide the funds necessary for banks to lend for
mortgages because they will not have legal recourse to protect
their interests.9° Because Nollan requires a finding of an "essential
nexus," investors can show that the safe harbor provision does not
83. Id.
84. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
85. Id. at 124.
86. See generally Eagle, supra note 69 at § 7-7(b)(2) (stating that the test
prohibits compensation where it is shown that the parcel is "capable of producing a
reasonable return" while claiming that it is reasonable for a flagship store to situate
themselves in a commercial development where it cannot sustain itself so that
surrounding stores can thrive because of its presence).
87. See Gradman, supra note 12, at Part V ("Yet, the question of how the dozen
words of the Clause and this stated purpose apply to particular government action
has engendered a mountain of impenetrable Supreme Court precedent that makes it
next to impossible to predict what regulations the Court will find go 'too far."').
88. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 stat.
1638 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)).
89. Grais, supra note 78.
90. Id.
2010]
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achieve the goals that the government set and that the taking is
unjustified.
2. Congressional Concern with the Safe Harbor as a Taking
In February 2009, the House passed H.R. 1106.91 The
language of its safe harbor provision differed greatly from the final
92version of the provision as amended in the Senate. The safe
harbor in H.R. 1106 would protect servicers "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, and notwithstanding any investment
contract between a servicer and a securitization vehicle or
investor." 93 After passage of H.R. 1106, investor lobbyists were
able to point out the legislature's misunderstanding of the
underlying securitization structure and how that misunderstanding
could lead to an unconstitutional taking. 94 The safe harbor was
modified in the Senate to give the investors limited opportunities
to bring suit against servicers.9'
Investor advocates have concluded that the Senate
amended the original safe harbor provision to avoid criticism on
Fifth Amendment grounds.96 After comparing the two bills, it is
clear that "the brazenness of the House bill may have made it
easier to convince a court that outright abrogation of contract
rights without just compensation violates the basic principles of the
Constitution. '" 97 Some fear that the Takings Clause will no longer
be able to aid the investors because the crafty language that
Congress used in S.896.9' On the other hand, considering the
limited situations where an investor can enforce contract rights,
91. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., supra note 7.
92. Owen L. Cyrulnik, The House and Senate Versions of Servicer Safe Harbor
Compared, ABS INVESTOR ADVOCATE, May 18, 2009, http://www.absinvestorad
vocate.com/ (follow "Servicer Safe Harbor" hyperlink; then follow "The House and
Senate Versions of Servicer Safe Harbor Compared" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20,
2010) [hereinafter Cyrulnik, House and Senate Versions].
93. Id. (quoting Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong.
(2009)).
94. Gradman, supra note 12, at Part IV.





MORTGAGE SERVICERS' SAFE HARBOR
the finalized provision seems to be as much a litigation shield as
the House provision.9 The statute clearly states that an investor
can only bring suit if the lender was involved in predatory lending
or engaged in fraudulent practices during origination. 100 Therefore
Congress's attempts to lessen the harm done to investors were
ineffective. Because investors are virtually powerless when
seeking to enforce their contractual rights, many have suspected
that the courts will agree that the safe harbor provision is
unconstitutional. 101
IV. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FROM THE SAFE HARBOR
The servicer litigation safe harbor, combined with other
incentives for servicers, "would create opportunities for mortgage
servicers to profit at the expense of investors who own the
loans." 102 Not only would servicers be able to receive incentive
payments for each modification, they would also be able to save
themselves from "legal punishment."'0' 3 In situations where the
loan servicer is also the initial lender and entered into the
mortgage agreement while engaged in unethical lending practices,
the servicer-lender could modify the loan under Helping Families
Save Their Homes, receive an incentive payment, and pass losses
off to the investors.' 4 There may also be instances of abuse when
the servicer holds the second mortgage.9' Four major banks
service more than half of the mortgages in the United States.
°6
Those banks are in the "perfect position" to make sure that the
99. See generally Owen Cyrulnik, How Safe, supra note 40. (discussing the Rule
of Construction clause that only permits suit in instances of fraud, violation of state
or federal law and predatory lending).
100. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 Stat.
1638 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)).
101. Gradman, supra note 12, at Part V.
102. Gretchen Morgenson, A Reality Check on Mortgage Modification, N.Y.




105. Eric Brenner & Hamish Hume, How Big Banks Want to Game the Mortgage
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mortgages are modified in a manner that benefits their second
mortgages; a method that contravenes bankruptcy policy because
second liens are supposed to be subordinate to primary liens.0 7 If
an investor in a first mortgage wanted to bring suit against a
servicer because the servicer modified the loan in a way that only
slightly benefitted the first mortgage but significantly benefitted
the second mortgage, the investor would not be able to proceed
because that suit would be based "solely" on the modification.0 8
Many investors feel as though they will not be able to
protect themselves from self-interested servicers who hold
subordinate loans.'09 Although investors seem powerless, one trust
that specializes in MBSs is testing the strength of the safe harbor
provision in court."1 In Greenwich Financial Services Distressed
Mortgage Fund v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, Greenwich
Financial Services argued that one of the major flaws in the safe
harbor; loan servicers can use the safe harbor to force others to
pay for their mistakes.1 As a part of a settlement for a predatory
lending claim, Countrywide Financial agreed to modify at least
50,000 mortgage loans and bear roughly $8.4 billion of associated
costs." ' Fortunately for Countrywide, "most of these loans are
owned not by Countrywide but rather by trusts to which
Countrywide sold the loans in the process of securitization. ' '..
Greenwich Financial, a trust that owns loans scheduled to be
modified, argued that its PSA prohibits Countrywide from
modifying without re-purchasing the loans.
14
Observers have commented that "if [the] Attorneys
General were truly hoping to punish Countrywide for its
107. Id.
108. Owen Cyrulnik, How Safe, supra note 40.
109. Morgenson, supra note 102.
110. Complaint, supra note 12.
111. Id. at 2.
112. Id. at 3, 13.
113. Id. at2.
114. Id. at 12. Although the Act allows investors to sue servicers when the lender
was involved with predatory lending under the Rule of Construction Clause, it is
unclear whether the mortgages that are being modified resulted from predatory
lending. One would assume that Greenwich's reliance on it's re-purchase provisions,
and lack of reliance on the Rule of Construction Clause, that the modifications are
not tied to the predatory lending.
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irresponsible lending practices, foisting the cleanup costs on
innocent investors was a remarkably ill-conceived way to do it."'1 5
Because the underlying issue of who will actually bear the costs
has just come to the surface, the future value of the safe harbor
provision is dependent on the decision in Greenwich Financial v.
Countrywide.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
Commentators and mortgage industry group have argued
that the mortgage market will be negatively affected by the safe
harbor provision.11 6 Giving servicers the ability to act in a manner
that breaches the duties set forth in PSAs without the possibility of
recourse will "[undermine] the Obama administration's stated
priority of fixing the housing market." The Washington Times
Editorial Board stated that "if lenders can't stop the people they
hire to manage mortgages from giving away their money, they
won't lend any.." 7 Grais & Ellsworth, the law firm representing
Greenwich Financial, released a list of reasons why the safe harbor
provisions "is bad for America. 1 1 8 Organizations like Greenwich
Financial support the view that the safe harbor provision will
"make mortgages harder to get" because the investors that provide
money for the big banks to loan out will not give as much if most
of the losses are shifted to them. 9 Fortunately, by not dismissing
Greenwich's suit the court has shown that investors may be able to
defend their contractual rights against servicers.
Although the federal court did not rule on the applicability
of the safe harbor provision, it did state that it will "allow people
to enforce their contract rights when it is appropriate" by
remanding the case to state court and requiring that Greenwich be
able to prove that the PSA explicitly states that Countrywide must
repurchase loans that it plans to modify. 2 Because it seems as
115. Gradman, supra note 12, at Part II.
116. Editorial, supra note 6.
117. Id.
118. Grais, supra note 78.
119. Id.
120. Morgenson, supra note 102.
121. Id.
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though the safe harbor could be potentially more harmful to the
housing market than foreclosures, many people have offered
solutions to the problem; one of which seems practicable.
On the other side of the debate, Yale professors Mayer,
Morrison, and Piskorski offered a policy solution to Congress in
January of this year that contained three elements that would help
turn around the housing market. The plan would (1) provide
monthly incentive fees to servicers who complete successful
modifications, (2) payments to second lienholders equal to five
percent of the outstanding second lien balance, and (3) a litigation
safe harbor that "eliminates explicit limits on modifications" and
compensates investors.' 3 The proposal establishes a compensation
scheme built into the modification plan itself. It requires that the
modifications made "improve[ ] payments to investors as a
group."' 24 The proposal does not make clear how much benefit
investors must receive but it implies that the investment return
must be increased at least marginally. 125 While the Act contains
many of the same elements that the professors proposed, the key
factor that would make the safe harbor workable and
constitutional is not present in the Act.126  As the professors
explain, their proposal would be constitutional "because investors
are compensated.'
2 7
Others feel as though compartmentalization is the best way
to turn around the housing market. Isaac Gradman, a San
Francisco litigator who specializes in subprime mortgage-related
litigation, suggests that the test of who should bear the losses
should be ad hoc. 28 His plan requires reviewing each mortgage
and placing them into three distinct categories; two of which result
in foreclosure. 29 Those two categories are mortgages resulting
from borrower fraud and mortgages that are at risk of default
122. Mayer et al., supra note 13, at 417-428.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 424.
125. Id.
126. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 Stat.
1638 (2009) (codified as amended 15 at U.S.C. § 1639a); Id.
127. Mayer et al., supra note 13, at 424.
128. Gradman, supra note 12, at Part VI.
129. Id.
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because the borrower lost his job or had a significant illness in the
family.13° The last category contains mortgages that are a result of
predatory lending practices and should, he claims, be modified at
the lender's expense.' However, this solution does not stop
second lienholders from taking advantage of their servicer status
modifying the loan in a manner that benefits the subordinate lien
more than the primary lien. This would cause the primary
lienholder to have to bear all of the costs while receiving little of
the benefit. While this would not harm the investors as much as
the safe harbor, this system may open the door to a different
takings claim. Also, this program would be extremely time-
consuming. One of the major complaints that members of
Congress have heard from their constituents is the length of time it
132takes for them to hear from someone about modification.
Requiring a servicer to review and categorize all loans would take
an immense amount of time and would make the program difficult
to implement. If one is waiting too long, their home may go into
foreclosure before they have any information about their
eligibility.
1 33
A third, workable alternative has been proposed by Curtis
Glovier, Managing Director of Fortress Investment Group, in his
testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee. 14  Glovier recommends refinancing rather than
modifying the existing mortgage because modifications result in
negative equity.
Refinancings will not be considered a taking by the
investors because the loans are set up in a manner that will allow
them to succeed in the future and avoid the re-default that
investors fear.136  As Glovier states, the economy cannot turn
around unless all interested parties are willing to take a small hit
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Glovier Testimony, supra note 26.
133. Preserving Homeownership: Progress Needed to Prevent Foreclosures:
Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong.
(2009).
134. Glovier Testimony, supra note 26, at 3-4.
135. Id. at 4.
136. See id.
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because "solutions cannot be a windfall for certain stakeholders
and terrible for others."'37
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the servicer litigation safe harbor provision
is unjust and potentially unconstitutional. The safe harbor
provision grants servicers too much discretion and an opportunity
to take advantage of the housing correction. 139 Because Congress
drafted the bill without a clear understanding of the securitization
structure, 14° it has potentially done more damage to the American
housing market than foreclosures ever could. 4' If Congress wants
to attain its goal of "fixing the housing market', 42 while continuing
to have the financial support of investors, 43 it would be best to
take investor and borrower interests into account and restructure
the Hope for Homeowners refinancing system to address the
problems of negative equity and re-defaults.'"
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137. Id.
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